The justice literature suggests, but has not tested, a positive relationship between met expectations about multiple workplace rewards and distributive justice evaluations (the individual ' s assessment of whether s/he has been treated fairly). Data from samples of teachers in South Korea (N = 649) and the U.S. (N = 810) are used to examine this relationship. In addition, U.S.¯South Korea cultural value differences in individualism, seniority, and hierarchical authority are the basis for hypothesizing that certain reward-specific met expectations will be linked differe ntly to justice e valuations across the two societies. As hypothesized for both societies, the more one ' s expectations about job-related re wards are met, the greate r the perception of just tre atme nt. Also as hypothesized, several societal differences based on cultural differences are found. Met expectations about autonomy are more important in explaining justice evaluations in the U.S., whereas met expectations about advancement opportunities are more important in South Korea.
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to examine how met expectations about workplace rewards are linked with justice evaluations (the individual ' s assessment of whether s/he has been treate d fairly) in two different cultural contexts, the U.S. and South Korea. Following the Confucian doctrine that is fundamental to South Korea, collectivity goals (rather than the individual goals in the U.S.), emphasis on seniority (rathe r than merit as in the U.S.), and a high level of respect (rathe r than skepticism as is ofte n found in the U.S.) of hierarchical authority are dominant societal values in South Korea (Chang, 1982; Han, 1987; Steinbe rg, 1989; Shin; 1991; Riordan & Vande nberg, 1994) . We show that these cultural distinctions provide the basis for hypothesizing difference s in how justice evaluations are forme d in these two societies. Specifically, utilizing data on teachers from two of the large st school districts in the two societies, we argue and find that although the general justice evaluation proce ss is the same cross-culturally, the justice evaluations in a give n society are base d on whether expectations have been met for the workplace rewards that are the most culturally relevant in that particular society. (1963, 1965) , interested primarily in equity as the principle for distributive justice, builds from an exchange perspective and focuse s on the mechanisms whereby individuals evaluate social exchange relationships. Specifically, individuals are assumed to think in terms of a ratio of outcomes (e.g., pay or promotions) to inputs (e.g., education or effort). This ratio determines the value the person gives to the exchange . The person ' s perception of justice or injustice regarding this exchange is based on a comparison of his/he r ratio with the same ratio for some comparison other. Since this influential formulation by Adams, numerous other justice formulations and argume nts have emerged (see Hegtvedt & Markovsky, 1995 , for a review). All justice argume nts, however, involve some form of evaluative comparison by an individual.
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

Adams
Following Adams again, a perceived " just " situation (when the ratios are the same ) is assume d to be acceptable to the individual, but a perceived " unjust " situation (when the ratios are different) is predicted to create tension and distre ss in the individual. This tension will motivate the individual to reduce it. The strength of the motivation will be proportional to the strength of the perceived injustice. Finally, perceived over-re ward (where guilt is supposed to be operating) will not have as strong an effect as perceived under-re ward. Both laboratory and field studies have generally supporte d the predictions from these basic justice argume nts (Greenberg, 1990; Hegtvedt, 1994; Mowday, 1983) .
A critical assumption of most justice arguments is that this tension in individuals is created because individuals generally value justice (Deutsch, 1985; Hegtvedt, 1993; Mowday, 1983) . The source of this value is usually not empirically assesse d but is assume d to be a general cultural value that is individually internalized through typical socialization proce sses (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1987) . This assumption that justice is value d does not
